Modal Philosophy
September 27, 2008 at 4:12 am Leave a comment
The primary problem I’m facing now is deceptively simple; what are modes? Combine this with the statement that each occurrence is necessarily unique in some respects, and it becomes obvious that primarily modality is an artifact of a representational system or systems, although it is real in various respects. It affects action (because it affects perception); modes can be shared (to some extent they have to be, because society per se is a product of shared perceptions which are the products of modes) and have stability. A repetitive characteristic of modes is the assumption of the norm; what is experienced “now” (variously defined) is what has been and will be. [Adaptation is the product most of all of pain.] Modes are absolutely not exclusive. Exclusive modes are the product of abstraction; Dooyeveert’s choice of “justice” as a mode was perhaps as perfect an example of this as could exist. Modes as we know them descriptively are lingually-derived. Experience itself is and must be pre-lingual. The behaviorists and Freudians both might or might not argue. If “conscious” experience then is lingual free will in most is arguable.
–Glenn
This is a tiny fragment of what I’ve been muttering about having thought about for forty years. I’ve finally come to some actual conclusions. Sort of; my philosophy doesn’t actually allow for absolutes, odd as that may seem. The true origin lies in the meeting of Aristotle, Plato, Socrates, Luther, and Calvin of all things. Throw in a little Bible (I did read it three times) and a few other books, plus at least a million words I’ve written (I’ve probably managed to get a thousand published).
Entry filed under: philosophy, writing and thought. Tags: behaviorism, dooyeveert, etymology, free will, lingually-oriented consciousness, methods of consciousness, methods of knowledge, modal, modal philosophy, modes, truth.
Trackback this post | Subscribe to the comments via RSS Feed